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THE REMEDIAL POWERS OF THE ADMIRALTY
STANLEY MORRISONt
IN the framing of the federal Constitution scant attention was paid
to that provision in Section 2 of Article III which declares that the
judicial power shall extend "to all cases of admiralty and maritime juris-
diction." Its future scope and importance could not then be realized,
and during the early years little use was made by litigants in maritime
cases of the new and unfamiliar jurisdiction of the federal courts. It
was only after a considerable period of development that the broad
issues arising out of the simply worded constitutional grant became
sufficiently pressing to require authoritative settlement. Yet there were
fundamental questions that had to be answered. It was natural that
the first of these to be worked out in a substantial way should be that of
the scope and limits of the admiralty jurisdiction granted to the federal
government. A second problem, seemingly of similar importance, but
which was more slowly developed, was that of the nature and sources
of the substantive law to be applied in the courts of admiralty. It was
necessary, thirdly, to determine what legislative power existed over the
body of maritime law and what constitutional limitations there might
be to restrict its exercise. Fourthly, the concurrent jurisdiction of
the common-law courts in maritime cases, which had survived the adop-
tion of the Constitution, called for some consideration.'
In their broad outlines all these issues have now been fairly well de-
fined. A somewhat different field of inquiry remains which has largely
escaped critical attention-the scope of the remedial powers of the ad-
miralty. Interest has recently been drawn to one aspect of this subject
tProfessor of Law, Stanford University. See the author's Workmen's Compensation and
the Maritime Law (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 472.
1. The judiciary Act of 1789 provided that the federal district courts should have "ex-
clusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction . . .
saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law
is competent to give it." 1 STAT. 77 (1789), 28 U. S. C. §§ 41, 371 (1926).
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by the passage of the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920,2 the constitutionality
of which has not yet been reviewed by the Supreme Court. While the
latter topic calls for ultimate consideration, it is the purpose of the
present article to examine the broader subject of the types of relief
generally available in our courts of admiralty. No attention, however,
will be given to the most characteristic procedural feature of the mari-
time law-the action in rem brought to enforce a maritime lien. The
power of the admiralty to entertain such a suit has always been unques-
tioned, and since it is the form of remedy that will be under examination
here, the law of the maritime lien is not involved. So with respect to
actions in personam for money damages arising out of maritime trans-
actions, there is little to be said. Such suits have always been main-
tainable in admiralty in this country. It is relief other than a money
judgment, whether the latter be obtained in an action in rem or in an
action in personam, and particularly equitable relief, that has caused
difficulty and that will be the subject of this discussion.
I
Before entering upon that subject, it will be desirable by way of
background to review briefly the way in which the courts have dealt
with the other major problems referred to above. At the outset the
district courts, sitting in admiralty, were faced with the necessity of
determining the extent of their jurisdiction. By the Judiciary Act of
1789' this was made coextensive, so far as civil causes are concerned,
with the constitutional grant; but the Constitution itself furnished no
key to the interpretation of the phrase "all cases of admiralty and mari-
time jurisdiction." Several standards were possible. The words might
have referred to the jurisdiction generally exercised by the maritime
courts on the continent of Europe, where the separate admiralty juris-
diction arose and became established. These tribunals had long exer-
cised a broad and comprehensive control over transactions of a maritime
nature. Or resort might have been made to the colonial vice-admiralty
jurisdiction, as it had been exercised in America prior to the Revolu-
tion. Or, finally, it might have been the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to embody the standards of the admiralty of England,
to which country the legal profession was accustomed to look for prece-
dents in other fields of law. This again would involve an inquiry as to
whether ancient precedent or the contemporary powers of the High
Court of Admiralty were to be followed. Broadly speaking, however,
these alternatives were reduced to two. For it has been commonly
assumed that the jurisdiction exercised by the vice-admiralty courts
2. Act of June 5, 1920, § 30, 41 STAT. 1000 (1920), 46 U. S. C. §§ 911-984 (1926).
3. Note 1, supra.
[Vol. 43
REMEDIAL POWERS OF ADMIRALTY
in the colonies was substantially as broad as that of the European mari-
time courts. 4 And the early powers of the English admiralty appear to
have been equally extensive. In the course of time, however, much of
its field had been taken away as a result of its familiar struggle with
the courts of common law. The latter, jealous and distrustful of a
tribunal which they regarded as alien, succeeded in reducing it to a
position of comparative impotence. Their general point of view was that
nothing should be left to the admiralty of which the common-law courts
could conveniently take cognizance. Particularly in contract cases, by
resorting to a locality test and restricting the admiralty to contracts
both made and to be performed upon the sea, the jurisdiction of the
latter was, with a few arbitrary exceptions, reduced nearly to the vanish-
ing point.
The real issue, then, in the courts of the United States was between
this narrow English jurisdiction, artificially limited and proved by expe-
rience even at home to have been undesirable,6 and the broader stand-
ards regarded elsewhere throughout the commercial world as fixing the
normal limits of the maritime jurisdiction. In the early decisions it
frequently was assumed without much consideration that the English
limitations were to be followed. Opposed to this view, however, was
the authority of Mr. Justice Story. In his bold and far-sighted opinion
in De Lovio v. Boit 7 he contended that it was to the maritime jurisdic-
tion known over all Europe that the language of the Constitution had
reference. It was not until 1847 that this great controversy was con-
clusively settled by the Supreme Court. In Waring v. Clark 8 in that
year, a majority, conscious of the needs of maritime commerce and of
national development, decided in favor of the broader jurisdiction. With
this and other decisions it became definitely established that
4. It has, however, been vigorously contended that in spite of the broad terms of the
commissions of the colonial vice-admiralty courts, the jurisdiction actually exercised by
them was no greater than that of the High Court of Admiralty in England at the same
period. See Woodbury, J., dissenting in Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 441, 467-481 (U. S.
1847); Daniel, J., dissenting in New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants' Bank,
6 How. 344, 395408 (U. S. 1848), and in Jackson v. The Steamboat Magnolia, 20 How.
296, 307-311 (U. S. 1857); and Campbell, J., dissenting in the latter case at 322-331.
But see argument of counsel in Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall. 1, 4-13 (U. S. 1870);
The Underwriter, 119 Fed. 713, 733-736 (D. Mass. 1902); HouGo, CAsES n VicE-
ADmIRALTY AND ADmIALTY (1925) xviii-xx.
5. For historical reviews of the English admiralty jurisdiction, see RoscoE, ADMIATAY
PRAcTiCE (5th ed. 1931) 1-36; 1 BENEDICT, AD3mIATY (5th ed. 1925) c. 4648; Morris, The
Jurisdiction and Practice of the High Court of Admiralty of England (1859) 4 SoL. J. 115,
137; Story, J., in De Lovio v. Boit, Fed. Cas. No. 3,776 (C. C. D. Mass. 1815).
6. The limitations imposed upon the High Court of Admiralty were eventually re-
moved by statute and its jurisdiction reestablished upon a normal basis. 3 & 4 Vicr.
c. 65 (1840), and 24 & 25 Vicr. c. 10 (1861).
7. Supra note 5.
8. Supra note 4.
1933]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
".. . the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States is not limited
either by the restraining statutes or the judicial prohibitions of England, but
is to be interpreted by a more enlarged view of its essential nature and objects,
and with reference to analogous jurisdictions in other countries constituting the
maritime commercial world, as well as to that of England." 9
Along with this problem of the jurisdiction it was necessary also to
decide what was the substantive law according to which maritime cases
were to be decided. Here again the Constitution was silent, although
the grant of judicial power necessarily presupposed the existence of
some body of law. This much was too clear for question, that the
admiralty courts must have been intended to apply the familiar, and
in fact the only known, system of sea law-the so-called "general mari-
time law," which with local variations was in force throughout Europe,
and the principal sources of which at the time of .the adoption of the
Constitution were to be found in the series of sea codes from the Laws
of Oleron to the Marine Ordinance of Louis XIV. But the adoption
of the general maritime law only partially solved the problem.10 For
one thing, that law was not incorporated in toto into the law of the
United States. Many provisions of the codes were obsolete, while others
were rejected as being unsuitable to conditions in this country. Fur-
thermore the old law was far from being a complete system and many
questions came before the admiralty courts which could not be decided
by any reference to the sea codes. In such cases the federal judges
generally drew upon the source to which they were most accustomed to
look for their rules-the common-law system. Sometimes they applied
principles of common law and sometimes even state statutes. They did
so without consideration of the difficulties that have agitated us at a
later day with respect to the precise status of such law in the admiralty.
To what extent was it state law subject to change by the states and to
what extent federal law, perhaps derived from, but now independent of,
state authority?
It was only in the series of decisions beginning with Southern Pacific
Co. v. Jensen in 1917 that the Supreme Court attempted to give a definite
9. Bradley, J., in Insurance Co. v. Dunham, supra note 4, at 24. See also New Jersey
Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants' Bank; Jackson v. The Steamboat Magnolia, both
supra note 4; (Anon.) History of Admiralty Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court of the
United States (1871) 5 Amr. L. Rav. 581. While European standards have been gen-
erally followed, the American jurisdiction has occasionally been more strictly limited.
See 4,885 Bags of Linseed, 1 Black 108, 113 (U. S. 1861); Ex parte Easton, 95 U. S.
68, 70 (1877).
10. On this general subject see The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 572-577 (U. S. 1874);
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 215 (1917); Panama 1R. Co. v. Johnson,
264 U. S. 375, 385-386 (1924); Wright, Uniformity in the Maritime Law of the United
States (1925) 73 U. OF PA. L. REv. 123, 126-131, 223, 236.
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answer to that question. Recognizing that in several instances state
statutes had been given effect in the admiralty, the Court limited their
application by the declaration that
"... no such legislation is valid if it contravenes the essential purpose ex-
pressed by an act of Congress or works material prejudice to the characteristic
features of the general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and
uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations." "
Under this now familiar formula a small border zone is set apart,
embracing primarily matters of local concern, in which state law is
followed. But throughout the major portion of the admiralty juris-
diction national uniformity of law is required, and the states, whether
by legislation or judicial decision, are rendered powerless to work
change."2 Now it so happens that this requirement of uniformity covers
a greater field than the body of rules derived from the general maritime
law. It embraces principles drawn from common-law sources, 3 and since
these principles cannot be changed by the states it must follow that
they have become federal law. It is thus clear that the courts, draw-
ing upon such sources as they have thought desirable, have built up in
admiralty a general system of federal case law, despite the protest of
Mr. Justice Holmes' 4 that the result constitutes unwarranted judicial
legislation.
Over this hybrid body of substantive law extends the legislative
power of Congress. While no such power is expressly granted by the
Constitution, its existence has always been assumed. At one period
there was a tendency to look to the commerce clause as the source of
congressional authority.' But it eventually became settled that the
power of legislation is derived by implication from the constitutional
grant of judicial power over admiralty and maritime cases, with the aid
11. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, supra note 10, at 216. Cf. The City of Norwalk,
55 Fed. 98 (S. D. N. Y. 1893).
12. See Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, 160 (1920).
13. A familiar illustration is the substitution of the common-law doctrine of respondeat
superior for the principles of limited liability contained in the general maritime law. See
Cunningham, Respondeat Superior in Admiralty (1906) 19 HARv. L. RaV. 445. Another
instance is the incorporation into the maritime law of common-law rules as to master and
servant. See Cunningham, The Extension to the Admiralty of the Fellow Servant Doc-
trine (1905) 18 HARv. L. REv. 294; The Howell, 273 Fed. 513 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921).
14. Dissenting in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, supra note 10, at 218, 220-222, and in
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, supra note 12, at 166, 167. It seems to be the view
of Mr. Justice Holmes, when principles unknown to the general maritime law are applied
in admiralty, that their source must lie in the common law of the States, that they are
enforced as state law, and hence that they must be subject to change by the several States.
15. See The Lottawanna, supra note 10, at 577; Miller, The Foreclosure of Vessel
Mortgages in Admiralty (1921) 70 U. OF PA. L. Ra,. 22.
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perhaps of the clause in Section 8 of Article I which empowers Congress
"To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
department or officer thereof."'16 So far as the nature of the substantive
maritime law is concerned, the control exercised by Congress is com-
plete and covers the entire field of admiralty jurisdiction. The most
characteristic principles of the maritime law may be abolished and others
substituted."
In other respects, however, the congressional power is subjected to
two important constitutional limitations. One, only recently formulated,
is that legislation (when not relating to matters primarily of local con-
cern) must be coextensive with and operate uniformly in the whole of
the United States.'8 This requirement of territorial uniformity is not
suggested by the express terms of the Constitution and the imposition
by the Supreme Court of such a restriction upon the legislative power
seems unjustified. The second limitation relates to the boundaries of
the admiralty jurisdiction. Since the judicial power is declared by the
Constitution to extend "to all cases of admiralty and maritime juris-
diction," the legislative power derived from the grant must be similarly
confined. And the determination of the common limits of the court
jurisdiction and the legislative power necessarily depends upon the inter-
pretation of the constitutional phrase. This, as the Supreme Court has
repeatedly declared, is exclusively a judicial function. 9 It is as clearly
so as the interpretation of the commerce clause or of due process of law.
It is true, to be sure, that in determining a doubtful question the Court
has been influenced by the action of Congress,2" but the scope of the
jurisdiction as ultimately fixed by the courts cannot be altered by legis-
lation. This proposition would not require emphasis if it were not that
there has been, and still is, a good deal of confusion as to the proper limits
of the legislative power in this field and the distinction between such
power and the judicial function.
16. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, supra note 10, at 214, 215; In re Garnett,
141 U. S. 1, 12 (1891); Butler v. Boston & Savannah Steamship Co., 130 U. S. 527,
555-557 (1889).
17. Panama Rr. Co. v. Johnson, supra note 10.
18. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, supra note 12; State of Washington v. W. C.
Dawson & Co., 264 U. S. 219 (1924). See Morrison, Workmen's Compensation and the
Maritime Law (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 472.
19. See The St. Lawrence, 1 Black 522, 527 (U. S. 1861); The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624,
640-641 (U. S. 1868); The Lottawanna, supra note 10, at 575-576; Butler v. Boston &
Savannah Steamship Co., supra note 16, at 557; The Blackheath, 195 U. S. 361, 365 (1904);
Panama Rr. Co. v. Johnson, supra note 10, at 386; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 55
(1932).
20. See The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443 (U. S. 1851).
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Of the general problems mentioned at the beginning of this discussion,
the one remaining is that of the concurrent jurisdiction of the common-
law courts in maritime cases. This matter does not call for much atten-
tion here, since it has little bearing on the major subject under considera-
tion. It suffices to say that as an original proposition it is open to ques-
tion whether the concurrent jurisdiction should ever have survived the
adoption of the Constitution. Such a power in the "land courts" is not
a typical accompaniment of a separate admiralty jurisdiction.2' It seems
to have originated in England as one of the many results of the common-
law encroachment upon the admiralty; and following English precedent,
it became established in the American colonies. It has been argued-
and with force-that this institution, along with other English limita-
tions upon the admiralty, should have been swept away by force of the
federal Constitution.22 The continuance of the concurrent jurisdiction
was, however, authorized by Congress in the so-called "saving clause"
of the Judiciary Act of 1789.23 Since then its existence has been unin-
terrupted and time has doubtless foreclosed question as to its constitu-
tionality. But it would seem at least that the existence of the common-
law jurisdiction is subject to the will of Congress; in other words, that
the enactment of the saving clause was a matter of grace, not of neces-
sity.2 4  Its effect has been limited by the recent establishment of the
doctrine that the common-law courts, in deciding maritime cases brought
before them under the saving clause, must apply the federal maritime
law and not their own state law.a'
II
Such being in brief the manner in which these various problems have
been solved, examination may now be made of the remedies available
to litigants in admiralty. This is a matter to which our courts have
21. In France, to take a leading example, although there were disputes with respect to
the proper limits of jurisdiction, no concurrent jurisdiction became established. Attempts
by other courts to invade the jurisdiction of the admiralty, unlike the common-law
invasion of the English admiralty, were unsuccessful. See 1 VALMI, CoiMMNTAIS sUa
L'ORDomNNAicE DE LA MA, Nn DU Mois D'AouT, 1681 (1766) 112-127. The jurisdiction
of the French admiralty was exclusive under the Ordonnance, Liv. I, Tit. II, Art. I and II.
In England likewise, there originally seems to have been no concurrent jurisdiction. See
Steele v. Thacher, Fed. Cas. No. 13,348, at 1205 (D. Me. 1825); De Lovio v. Boit, supra
note 5. In Canada, admiralty jurisdiction is exclusively vested in the Exchequer Court.
See MAYERS, ADumALTY LAW Aim PRACTICE ix CANADA (1916) 1, 33.
22. Bausman, Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction (1902) 36 Am. L. REV. 182.
23. Note 1, supra.
24. See Panama Rr. Co. v. Johnson, supra note 10, at 388, 390; Wright, supra note 10,
at 136.
25. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, supra note 10; Chelentis v. Luckenbach Steamship
Co., 247 U. S. 372 (1918).
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given little thought, and it may be worth while to inquire how far the
results reached are consistent with the broad purposes of the maritime
jurisdiction and the fundamental principles which elsewhere have con-
trolled its exercise.
At the start it is necessary to review the state of the English law
on this subject prior to and during the early period of American inde-
pendence; for it is only in the light of the situation in the parent country
that the development of the law in the United States can be understood.
This, it will be remembered, was the period of eclipse of the English
admiralty, when the jurisdiction of that court with respect to subject-
matter was so radically limited by the prohibitions of the common-law
courts. The same forces made themselves felt with respect to the
remedial powers of the admiralty. The guiding principle has been thus
stated by an English writer:
"Although the common lawyers were not able always to hold, firmly and con-
sistently, the ground which they had taken, they seem, so far as they could,
to have acted upon the broad rule that nothing was to be left to the Admiralty
of which the common law could conveniently take cognizance. This principle,
though not always avowed, and often hidden behind quaint arguments, and
sometimes only loosely enforced, seems to have been the guiding principle of all
the early decisions. Had the system of common law procedure been more
elastic than it was, doubtless it would have been made to embrace the whole
jurisdiction of the Admiralty, and one great anomaly in our law would have
been removed. But the technical process of the Courts of common law limited
their jurisdiction, and hampered their procedure; and it was impossible, with
any show of justice, to prohibit suitors from resorting to the Admiralty in cases
where that Court alone could afford a satisfactory remedy. So that, as mat-
ters at last adjusted themselves, the Admiralty judges, although compelled to
abandon all claim to general maritime jurisdiction, were yet suffered to exer-
cise undisputed authority in all maritime cases where the common law could
not give redress." 26
This conception at once suggests the distinction between proceedings
in rem and in personam. Since the common-law procedure made no
provision for the former, the land courts could not give that sort of
relief. Hence the jurisdiction of the admiralty over actions in rem
remained unimpaired within the domain otherwise left to it by the courts
of common law. But where the suit was in personam, there was no
procedural difficulty at common law. And if the broad rule acted upon
by the land courts were logically applied, it would necessarily follow
that no jurisdiction at all in personam would be left to the admiralty.
As a matter of fact just this position was taken by the common-law
judges, although it was never enforced to its ultimate limits. In tort
26. RoscoE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 8-9.
[Vol. 43
REMEDIAL POWERS OF ADMIRALTY
cases the admiralty always preserved some personal jurisdiction, al-
though it perhaps was restricted to cases originally connected with
the disciplinary authority of the admiralty and certainly was exercised
to a much more limited extent than the jurisdiction in rem. In cases of
contract, however, the restriction seems to have become complete and
the jurisdiction in personam extinguished, with the exception only of
suits for seamen's wages and suits based upon stipulations.2"
Furthermore, in cases where relief other than money damages was
sought, the powers of the High Court of Admiralty were consistently
limited to proceedings which, in form at least, were in rem. This class
of cases included disputes between part owners and actions to recover
possession of ships. With respect to part owners of ships the major
principles of substantive law governing their relations were, that the
majority in interest had the right to use the vessel as they saw fit; that
as between equal owners the one who was in possession had the power of
a majority owner; and that as against the power of control vested in the
majority, the minority interests, if they dissented from the voyage,
had merely the right to security for the safe return of the vessel. This
right was enforced by an action of restraint, in which the ship was ar-
rested and detained by the court until the requisite security was fur-
nished. In the event of disagreements between part owners the ad-
miralty had no power to order a sale of the ship for purposes of parti-
tion, this apparently being regarded as too much in the nature of an
exercise of jurisdiction in personam. If the minority were in possession
and refused to surrender the ship, the majority could recover her in a
possessory action, which, like the action of restraint, was a proceeding
directly against the vessel herself."
Similarly, in any case in which possession was wrongfully withheld from
a shipowner, he could maintain a possessory action in admiralty. For-
merly the jurisdiction had extended also to actions brought to try
title to a ship (petitory actions). But this power had been taken away
by the prohibitions of the common-law judges, so that even in an action
for possession, once the title was put in substantial issue the jurisdic-
tion of the admiralty was ousted.29 It followed that that court could
27. 2 BROWNE, ClVI= LAW AND THE LAW OF ADwmniT'ir (1st Am. ed. 1840) 100-118;
MAYms, op. cit. supra note 21, at 5-26; Menetone v. Gibbons, 3 T. R. 267 (K. B. 1789);
Queen v. Judge of the City of London Court, [1892] 1 Q. B. 273. Cf. De Lovio v. Boit,
supra note 5, at 439.
28. Ouston v. Hebden, 1 Wils. 101 (K. B. 1745); The Apollo, 1 Hagg. Adm. 306
(1824); The Margaret, 2 Hagg. Adm. 275 (1829); ABBOTT, LAW OF MERCANT SHIPS
AND SEA.nar (14th ed. 1901) 117-128; RoscoE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 43-46.
29. Thomson v. Smith, 2 Keb. 158 (K. B. 1667); The Guardian, 3 C. Rob. 93 (Adm.
1800); The Aurora, 3 C. Rob. 133 (Adm. 1800); Baxter v. Blanshard, 3 Dow. & Ry. 177
(K. B. 1823); 1 CoNKLING, ADnMRALTY (2d ed. 1857) 330-339; 2 BROWNE, op. cit. supra
note 27, at 114-118, 430-431; ROSCOE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 9, 37-40.
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protect only the legal owner and could not enforce equitable titles or
take cognizance of any equitable claims to the res. For the recogni-
tion of such rights would involve an inquiry into the state of the title
as clearly as the determination of a disputed legal interest. This in-
ability of the admiralty to deal with questions of title is enough to
explain numerous limitations upon its powers with respect to relief
of an equitable nature. In determining the majority interests in a
possessory action equitable ownership could not be taken into considera-
tionY0 Trusts obviously could not be dealt with at all. So where trans-
fer of the legal title had been secured by fraud, the maritime court
could not restore possession to the defrauded owner. He had to resort
to the chancery for relief." Nor could the admiralty entertain a pos-
sessory action brought by the mortgagee of a ship. Not only was it
debarred from giving him affirmative relief, but it could not recognize
him in any way even when he appeared in a suit instituted by some one
else, merely to protect his interest. The reason regularly stated for
this lack of jurisdiction with respect to mortgages was that the admiralty
could not interfere with questions of title or property.
2
The question remains of equitable remedies in which no matters of
title are involved. It has been suggested that with respect to powers
analogous to those of a court of equity, the High Court of Admiralty
was not subjected to the usual restrictions upon its jurisdiction. For
the principal source of these restrictions lay in the prohibitions of the
common-law courts, which were interested in the preservation of trial
by jury; and they had no motive for taking from the admiralty powers
which would only have to be turned over to another court.33  This
suggestion, however, cannot be given any general acceptance, since it
leaves out of consideration the influence upon the admiralty jurisdiction
of the equity court itself. The relations between the admiralty and
the Chancellor have escaped the attention which has been paid to the
famed struggle between the former and the courts of common law. In
some respects their course was different. In the seventeenth century
the court of chancery seems to have claimed a general concurrent juris-
diction with the admiralty and even asserted the right in the exercise
of that jurisdiction to remove any cause out of the admiralty. 4 Poten-
30. The Valiant, 1 W. Rob. 64 (Adm. 1839); The Sisters, 5 C. Rob. 155 (Adm. 1804).
31. The Pitt, 1 Hagg. Adm. 240 (1824); The Warrior, 2 Dods. 288 (Adm. 1818).
32. Morris, supra note 5, at 119; The Fruit Preserver, 2 Hagg. Adm. 181 (1828);
The Portsea, 2 Hagg. Adm. 84 (1827); The Exrmouth, 2 Hagg. Adm. 88n (1828); The
Percy, 3 Hagg. Adm. 402 (1837); The Prince George, 3 Hagg. Adm. 376 (1837). See
also The Neptune, 3 Hagg. Adm. 129, 132 (1834); The Fortitude, 2 W. Rob. 217, 222
(Adm. 1843); The Dowthorpe, 2 W. Rob. 73 (Adm. 1843).
33. Johnson, 3., in Ramsay v. Allegre, 12 Wheat. 611, 620 (U. S. 1827); RoscoE, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 8n.
34. Blad v. Bamfield, 3 Swanst. 604 (Ch. 1674); Denew v. Stock, 3 Swanst. 66Z
(Ch. 1677); Rex v. Carew, 3 Swanst. 669 (Ch. 1682).
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tially the Chancellor was in a better position than the common-law
judges to encroach upon the maritime jurisdiction, since his greater
powers, particularly in the issuance of injunctions, made it possible
for him to invade the field even of the action in rem in a way in which
the common-law judges could not. But by the nineteenth century any
exercise by the Chancellor of a real concurrent jurisdiction apparently
had ceased, although some doubt was expressed as to its the-
oretical existence. This question arose principally with respect to
the enforcement of the right of the minority owners of a ship to security
for her safe return from a voyage from which they dissented. The
normal remedy was an action of restraint in admiralty, but an injunction
from the court of equity would be equally effective. What actually
happened was that the latter court declined to interfere unless the owner-
ship interests were in dispute. In such event the admiralty jurisdiction
was ousted on account of the question of title and the Chancellor would
grant relief by means of an injunction restraining the sailing of the
vessel until security was given.3
The inability, or at least refusal, of the Chancellor to exercise a con-
current jurisdiction in cases like this did not, however, result in a very
serious curtailment of his activities. For it applied only when the ordi-
nary proceedings in rem in the admiralty were sufficient to afford ade-
quate relief. In all proceedings in personam, and in instances where any
characteristically equitable relief was called for, the Chancellor always
exercised the same full jurisdiction in maritime that he did in non-
maritime cases. 6 And the question of concurrent jurisdiction was elim-
inated by the exclusion of the court of admiralty from the field. The
result was that such forms of relief as an accounting, specific perform-
ance, injunction, reformation or cancellation of contracts and relief
against fraud generally, were available exclusively in chancery. Where
suits were brought in admiralty which called for equitable relief, the
Chancellor would enjoin the prosecution of the action33 Although re-
ported instances of these injunctions are few, they were as effective as
the writs of prohibition issued by the common-law judges. The admiralty
was so restricted that it even lacked the power, when a vessel had been
35. Haly v. Goodson, 2 Meriv. 77 (Ch. 1816); Christie v. Craig, 2 Meriv. 137 (Ch.
1817); Castelli v. Cook, 7 Hare 89 (V. C. 1849); Brenan v. Preston, 2 De G. M. & G.
813 (Ch. 1852).
36. Subject to restrictions arising out of provisions of the ship registry acts with re-
spect to the registration of equitable interests in ships. See (Anon.) On Equitable Inter-
ests in Ships (1862) 13 LAW MAO. & Rav. 70.
37. The Apollo, supra note 28; Haly v. Goodson, supra note 35; The John, 3 C. Rob.
288 (Adm. 1801); The Virtue, 1 Spinks 77 (Adm. 1853); Roscos, op. cit. supra note 5, at
47-48; MAYEms, op. cit. supra note 21, at 60.




sold in an action in rem and the maritime claims paid off, to distribute
the balance of the proceeds to any non-maritime claimants such as mort-
gagees or supply-men. The most it could do was to hold the fund
pending litigation in another court.39 The relative position of the courts
of equity and of admiralty is further revealed by the fact that when
statutes were passed providing for limitation of the liability of ship-
owners, jurisdiction over limitation proceedings was (prior to 1861)
vested exclusively in the chancery and not in the admiralty.
40
No inherent need is apparent for these limitations upon the powers
of the admiralty in dealing with cases whose subject-matter is maritime.
Originally in England such powers were certainly broader." And it
was always recognized that in the general exercise of its jurisdiction
the admiralty was not bound by the technical limitations surrounding
a court of common law, but could act in accordance with broad equitable
principles.4" This was natural enough since in its origin it was a court
of civil law, whence it derived its procedure as well as the substantive
principles of the general maritime law. But the scope of its specific reme-
dial powers was not controlled by the same source. In the imposing
of the limitations which developed as to equitable relief, two influences
seem to have been at work. For one thing, certain procedural restric-
tions, such as the requirement that testimony be taken by deposition,
prevented the admiralty from acting with the same freedom as a court
of equity.43 The second, and major, consideration seems to have been
the same conception which governed the restriction of the maritime juris-
diction by the common-law courts-namely, that the admiralty should
proceed only in rem. The dominant idea was that actions in rem be-
longed to the admiralty and actions in personam to the land courts,
whether of common law or of equity.44
In England today these limitations have been swept away. The
Admiralty Court Acts of 1840 and 1861, which reestablished the mari-
time jurisdiction upon a normal basis, largely extended its remedial
39. Bernard v. Hyne, 6 Moore P. C. 56 (1847); The Neptune, 3 Knapp 94 (1835);
The Portsea; The Exmouth, both supra note 32.
40. 7 GEo. II c. 15 (1734); 26 GEo. III c. 86 (1786); 53 GEo. III c. 159 (1813);
17 & 18 Vicr. c. 104, § 514 (1854). See also 24 & 25 Vicr. c. 10, § 13 (1861); Milburn v.
London & South Western Ry. Co., L. R. 6 Ex. 4 (1870).
41. See 1 BENEDICt, op. cit. supra note 5, §§ 621-623.
42. See The Juliana, 2 Dods. 504, 521 (Adm. 1822); The Minerva, 1 Hagg. Adm.
347, 357-358 (1825); The Harriett, 1 W. Rob. 182, 192 (Adm. 1841); The Jacob, 4 C.
Rob. 245, 250 (Adm. 1802).
43. See The Pitt, supra note 31, at 243-244; Duncan v. M'Calmont, supra note 38,
at 417-419; 1 CoxuLuNrG, op. cit. supra note 29, at 336-338.
44. See The Neptune, supra note 39, at 105, 117-118; Mackenzie v. Ogilvie, Mars.
Adm. 134, 138 (1774).
45. 3 & 4 VicT. c. 65 (1840); 24 & 25 VicT. c. 10 (1861).
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powers. The major restriction with respect to actions in personam
was removed by the provision (Section 35 of the Act of 1861) that
"The jurisdiction conferred by this Act on the High Court of Admiralty
may be exercised either by proceedings in rem or by proceedings in
personam." In actions between part owners the court was empowered
to settle all accounts and to direct a sale of the ship. Another far-
reaching change consisted in the grant of jurisdiction to hear cases in-
volving ship mortgages and to decide all questions as to the title to or
ownership of vessels. Finally, the restrictions with respect to types
of relief in maritime cases have ceased to be of importance since the
reorganization of the English courts under the Judicature Act of 1873.46
By this statute the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty was
assigned to the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High
Court of Justice. And since that Division, as part of the High Court,
may exercise all the jurisdictional powers of any judge thereof, it fol-
lows that the scope of relief, equitable or otherwise, available in a mari-
time case is now as complete as in any other class of litigation. Thus
in England the old rules have ceased to be of more than historical im-
portance. In the United States, on the other hand, their influence is
still felt.
III
In tracing now the development of the American law with respect to
remedies in admiralty, the recurrent issue will be found to be whether
or not these old English limitations should be followed and if so, to
what extent. With respect to the primary matter of jurisdiction in
personam the question was of critical importance. Since the courts of
this country took a broad view of the scope of admiralty jurisdiction
and generally refused to follow the narrow limits established in England
with respect to its subject-matter, a far larger field existed than in Eng-
land for disputes maritime in nature but in which there would be no
maritime lien and hence no remedy in rem. If the admiralty courts
here could not have entertained suits in personam, the exercise of this
broader jurisdiction would have been largely crippled. Hence the rejec-
tion of the English tests of jurisdiction necessarily carried with it the
rejection of the general English limitation with respect to personal
actions, and that limitation never acquired a foothold in the United
States so far as actions for money damages were concerned. That the
opponents of the admiralty were alive to the significance of this is re-
vealed by the vigorous protest of Mr. Justice Johnson in Ramsay v.
46. 36 & 37 Vicr. c. 66 (1873). See RoscoE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 16-24, 37;
MACLACEMAN, MERCHANT SnIPP3NhG (6th ed. 1923) 49, 79, 98; MAYEms, op. cit. supra note
21, at 60, 69; Nicholas v. Dracachis, 1 P. D. 72 (1875) ; The Horlock, 2 P. D. 243 (1877);
Bow, McfrLachlan & Co. v. Ship "Camosun," [1909 A. C. 597, 608.
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Allegre41 in 1827, against the exercise of any greater jurisdiction in per-
sonam than that allowed to the High Court of Admiralty in England.
With regard to relief other than money damages, the English influ-
ence was not disposed of so easily, although there were a few other
instances in which the American courts continued to show their inde-
pendence. Thus in the case of suits between part owners, the course
of development was much the same as with the major issue of the gen-
eral scope of admiralty jurisdiction. There was a tendency on the part
of a few of the early federal judges to regard themselves as bound by
English rules and hence to hold that they had no power to decree a
sale. But by a preponderance of authority it became established that
here too the example of the mother country should be discarded." And
English precedents being eliminated, there was no more reason to doubt
the power of the admiralty to decree a sale for purposes of partition
between part owners than its power to sell the boat for the satisfaction
of a maritime lien.
There did remain, however, the problem of determining the rules
of substantive law which should govern such sales. The normal source
of substantive rules was of course the general maritime law, and in this
case that law was sought in the code of France.49  This was a natural
step, since during the formative period in this country the Marine Ordi-
nance of Louis XIV was the greatest in prestige of the sea codes. The
provisions of this code authorized the admiralty to sell at the suit of
a part owner, but only under very limited conditions as compared with
the codes of some other countries which freely allowed one part owner
to force a partition upon the rest.o In the case of unequal ownership
interests there was no such right at all, the majority having the full
power of control over the use of the vessel. Even where the interests
47. Supra note 33. See also The General Smith, 4 Wheat. 438 (U. S. 1819); HENrY,
JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE OF Tn ADM mAI.TY.COURTS (1885) § 115.
48. The Orleans v. Phoebus, 11 Pet. 175 (U. S. 1837); Head v. Amoskeag Manufactur-
ing Co., 113 U. S. 9, 22-23 (1885); The Seneca, Fed. Cas. No. 12,670 (C. C. E. D. Pa.
1829); The Vincennes, Fed. Cas. No. 16,944 (D. Me. 1851); Burr v. The St. Thomas, Fed.
Cas. No. 2194a (S. D. N. Y. 1851); The Annie H. Smith, Fed. Cas. No. 420 (S. D. N. Y.
1878); Coyne v. Caples, 8 Fed. 638 (D. Ore. 1881); The Akutan, 17 F. (2d) 266 (W. D.
Wash. 1927); The Katalla, 17 F. (2d) 268 (W. D. Wash. 1927). On the general subject
of part owners see the excellent annotations in (1902) 90 Am. St. Rep. 355, and L. R. A.
1917A, 1108. As to the jurisdiction of the admiralty to decree the sale of a ship upon
application of the master on the ground of unseaworthiness, see 1 BarENicr, op. cit. supra
note 5, § 112; 1 CONxLmrG, op. cit. supra note 29, at 311-317; 1 PARSONS, SHIPPING AND
AD-niTy (1869) 74-78; 2 id. at 340-342.
49. Ordonnance de la Marine, Liv. II, Tit. VIII, Art. V & VI; 1 VAuiN, op. cit. supra
note 21, at 575-588.
50. See MACLACHLAN, op. cit. supra note 46, at 74-75, 78; JACOBSEN, LAWS OF THE
SEA (Am. ed. 1818) 40-42; SroRY, PARTNERSHYP (5th ed. 1859) § 437. Cf. France, Code
of Commerce (1807) Art. 220; Italy, Code of Commerce (1883) Art. 495.
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were equally divided, there was not a right of sale in every case. If
one moiety wished to employ the ship and the other moiety wished to
keep her idle, the former had the right to take her out in spite of the
protest of the latter; and her employment being thus assured, no parti-
tion was authorized. But where both parties wished to use the ship but
disagreed as to the voyage, the activity of the vessel would be paralyzed
unless the law provided some means of breaking the deadlock. The
English admiralty, having no power of sale, met this difficulty by be-
stowing upon the half-owner in possession the powers of a majority.
But it was in this situation that the French admiralty was authorized to
sell. In order that the owners of a half-interest might secure a parti-
tion, it was thus necessary for them to show that they proposed, on their
part, a designated voyage, or at least for them to give plausible rea-
sons for their objection to that desired by the other moiety.
These French rules were taken over bodily into the law of the United
States."' But the law of France had this defect, that it did nothing to
protect the interests of a dissentient minority owner. In England on
the other hand, such owner had the right, non-existent on the Continent,
to security for the safe return of the vessel, and it was the practice of
the High Court of Admiralty to restrain the sailing of the vessel until
such security had been given. This beneficent principle of the English
law was incorporated into the American law along with the French rules
as to the power of sale. Still another difficulty, however, was common to
both the French and English law. The right of majority owners to
control the use of the vessel was so complete that, if they chose, they
could keep her idle 2 This result seems inconsistent with the broad
public interest in keeping the vessel in navigation, as well as with the
interests of dissentient minority owners desirous of profiting from their
investment. And under a few of the old codes it seems to have been
possible, if the majority did not wish to employ the vessel, for the minor-
ity to send her to sea. So far as the French law is concerned, Valin
justifies the rejection of such a rule on the ground that the majority must
be presumed to have good reasons for wishing to keep the ship in port;
and if the minority were permitted to send her out, an irresponsible
part owner, having only a small interest in the ship, could expose the
rest to risks which prudence would avoid. But the English device of
51. It has been suggested by the American courts that the power of sale might be
exercised in certain other situations where circumstances would otherwise prevent the
employment of the vessel; but in actual practice sales have been ordered only where they
would have been authorized under the Ordinance of Louis XIV. See Tunno v. The
Betsina, Fed. Cas. No. 14,236, at 319-320 (D. S. C. 1857); The Ocean Belle, Fed. Cas.
No. 10,402, at 525 (S. D. N. Y. 1872).
52. 1 VAsim, op. cit. supra note 21, at 582-583; 1 ABBOTT, op. cit. supra note 28, at
120; The Elizabeth and Jane, 1 W. Rob. 278 (Adm. 1841). The earlier English law may
have been different. See MOLLOY, DE JUaRE MARIIMO ET NAvALi (1744) 220-222.
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exacting security for the safe return of the vessel offered a means of
meeting this difficulty. If the majority owners wished to leave the
vessel idle, the public interest could be promoted by permitting the
minority to employ her and the majority could be protected by requir-
ing those taking the vessel out to give security for her safe return.
While this logical step was not taken by. the English courts, it is the
view which has been favored in the United States."' The whole result
constitutes an interesting illustration of the selective process involved
in the formulation of our maritime law.
Today this subject of part owners is of small practical importance.
But it is of significance in the present study because of the definite
rejection by the American courts of English limitations upon the ad-
miralty powers and because of the independence shown in the formula-
tion from all available sources of a body of rules thought to be best
adapted to American conditions. A similar point of view was taken
when the issue first arose of whether our courts of admiralty had power
to entertain a petitory action. It was declared by Justice Story in 1830
in a notable opinion delivered on circuitn4 that the inability of the Eng-
lish admiralty to decide questions of title to ships was an artificial limita-
tion upon the normal powers of maritime courts, that the English prece-
dents were not of weight and that in this country there was no distinction
in point of jurisdiction between petitory and possessory actions. This
holding that the admiralty had power to decide questions of title as well
as questions of possession was followed by the Supreme Court twenty-five
years later, with the usual dissent from a representative of the group
which sought to impose all the English limitations upon the admiralty
jurisdiction in the United States. 5
Thus far, then, the American courts consistently rejected the English
rules, in order to establish the admiralty jurisdiction in this country
upon a broad and sound basis. But it was at this point that their inde-
pendence halted. When the matter of equitable rights and equitable
relief was reached, they conformed to the English practice as regularly
as in other instances they had departed from it. Thus, it having been
determined that the admiralty courts of this country could try disputed
titles, the question arose of whether equitable interests in the title to
a ship could be considered. The accepted answer was that such interests
53. See The Orleans v. Phoebus, supra note 48, at 184; Lewis v. Kinney, Fed. Cas. No.
8,325, at 485 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1879); HUGHEs, ADmuRALT (2d ed. 1920) 339; STORY,
op. cit. supra note 50, §§ 428, 434; 2 PAIsoNs, op. cit. supra note 48, at 239-242. Cf.
Willings v. Blight, Fed. Cas. No. 17,765 (D. Pa. 1800).
54. The Tilton, Fed. Cas. No. 14,054 (C. C. Mass. 1830).
55. Ward v. Peck, 18 How. 267 (U. S. 1855). See also Grigg v. The Clarissa Ann, Fed.
Cas. No. 5,826 (C. C. E. D. Va. 1877); The Blairmore I, 10 F. (2d) 35 (C. C. A. 2d,
1925).
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were beyond the reach of a maritime court. So when a petitory action
is brought in admiralty, the court must confine itself to a determination
of the legal title. The establishment and protection of equitable inter-
ests in the ship must be left to the ordinary land courts of equity juris-
dictionY6 Similarly, an equitable right to possession may not be en-
forced in admiralty, although a legal right to possession may be so
enforced even where it is based on some interest other than the title
itself. 7
So also where any of the ordinary types of affirmative equitable relief
were sought, the view which received acceptance was that the admiralty
did not possess the characteristic powers of a court of equity. It has
accordingly been regularly held in this country that the admiralty may
not grant an injunction,"s maintain a bill or libel for specific perfor-
mance," administer or enforce a trust,60 reform or cancel a maritime
contract, or grant other equitable relief against fraud or mistake."'
Nor may an action for an accounting be maintained, regardless of the
maritime nature of the transaction involved.62
In all of these cases where equitable relief is denied, the same result
would have been reached in England on the same facts. It must be
56. The Eclipse, 135 U. S. 599 (1890); The Perseverance, Fed. Cas. No. 11,017
(S. D. N. Y. 1833); Cole v. The Brandt, Fed. Cas. No. 2,978 (S. D. N. Y. 1841); The
William D. Rice, Fed. Cas. No. 17,691 (D. Mass. 1857); The C. C. Trowbridge, 14 Fed.
874 (N. D. Ill. 1883); The G. Reusens, 23 Fed. 403 (S. D. N. Y. 1885); The Ella J.
Slaymaker, 28 Fed. 767 (D. Del. 1886).
57. See The Bonnie Doon, 36 Fed. 770 (D. Del. 1888); Sea Insurance Co. v. About
800 Tons of Steel Rails, 191 Fed. 250 (E. D. Mich. 1911); The Nellie T., 235 Fed. 117
(C. C. A. 2d, 1916).
58. Paterson v. Dakin, 31 Fed. 682 (S. D. Ala. 1887).
59. Davis v. Child, Fed. Cas. No. 3,628 (D. Me. 1840); Kynoch v. The S. C. Ives,
Fed. Cas. No. 7,958 (N. D. Ohio 1856); lbeely v. The Ernest & Alice, Fed. Cas. No. 3,735
(D. Md. 1868); Paterson v. Dakin, supra note 58; The Robert R. Kirkland, 92 Fed. 407
(D. N. J. 1899).
60. The Eclipse, supra note 56; Davis v. Child, supra note 89; Kellum v. Emerson,
Fed. Cas. No. 7,669 (D. Mass. 1854); Wenberg v. A Cargo of Mineral Phosphate, 18
Fed. 285 (S. D. N. Y. 1883).
61. Andrews v. Essex Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Fed. Cas. No. 374 (C. C. D. Mass.
1822); The Union, 20 Fed. 539 (N. D. Ill. 1884); Williams v. Providence Washington
Insurance Co., 56 Fed. 159 (S. D. N. Y. 1893); Simmons Transportation Co. v. Alpha
Portland Cement Co., 286 Fed. 955 (S. D. N. Y. 1922); The Thomas P. Beal, 298 Fed.
121 (W. D. Wash. 1924); Koninklijke Nederlandsche Stoomboot Maatschappij v. Yglesias
& Co., Inc., 37 F. (2d) 103 (S. D. N. Y. 1930).
62. Grant v. Poillon, 20 How. 162 (U. S. 1857); Ward v. Thompson, 22 How. 330
(U. S. 1859); The Fair Play, Fed. Cas. No. 4,615 (S. D. N. Y. 1830); The H. E. Willard,
52 Fed. 387 (C. C. D. Me. 1892). On the general subject of equitable relief, see further
1 B~mmicr, op. cit. supra note 5, § 70; HENRY, op. cit. supra note 47, §§ 25, 107; 2 PaR-
soNs, op. cit. supra note 48, at 344; Dean v. Bates, Fed. Cas. No. 3,704 (C. C. D. Mass.
1846); The Owego, 289 Fed. 263 (W. D. Wash. 1923); Suzuki v. Central Argentine Ry.,
27 F. (2d) 795, 807 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), cert. den., 278 U. S. 652 (1929).
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apparent, however, from the foregoing review of the English law that
there the limitations upon the powers of the maritime court were drawn
along totally different lines. The High Court of Admiralty could not
determine equitable interests in the title to a ship; but this was not
because of any distinction between equitable interests and legal inter-
ests, but because the court was denied the power to deal with questions
of title at all. The High Court of Admiralty could not cancel a mari-
time contract or order it specifically performed, not because the English
judges drew any distinction between legal relief and equitable relief, but
because the admiralty was denied the power generally to act in per-
sonam. In a court restricted to proceedings in rem, the matter of equit-
able relief was eliminated. While it is true that the English admiralty
did in exceptional instances exercise some jurisdiction in personam, this
was too limited in scope to affect the situation from the present point
of view.
Why, then, should the courts of admiralty in the United States be
denied an equitable jurisdiction, in view of the fact that here the basic
English restrictions against entertaining suits in personam and against
dealing with the title have been definitely rejected? So far as there was
any further justification for the result in England, it lay in the fact that
in the old days the High Court of Admiralty was subject to certain
procedural limitations, which impaired its effectiveness as compared
with the chancery. But these limitations have not existed in the United
States. Hence in so far as English influence is responsible, the result
reached here is inconsistent and illogical; and unless some independent
justification can be found, it is unjustifiable. Perhaps the best way to
see the situation in its true light is to apply the same technique which
was resorted to in the determination of other major questions of ad-
miralty jurisdiction in this country, as., for example, that of the extent
of the waters subject to the admiralty, the test of jurisdiction in contract
cases, and the power to act in personam. In each of these instances the
same fundamental issue was involved. Did the Constitution contem-
plate the establishment of a maritime jurisdiction on the narrow and
ineffective lines of the High Court of Admiralty, or was it the intention
to establish that jurisdiction upon a broad and independent basis suited
to the conditions existing in this country? In each instance, of course,
the English model was rejected; and so far as precedents were needed
the courts looked to the law and practice of the maritime tribunals of
the Continent. 3
Suppose that the matter of equitable relief were approached in the
same way. The dominant conception would seem to be that when a
63. See The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, supra note 20; The General Smith, supra note
47; Ramsay v. Aflegre, supra note 33; Insurance Co. v. Dunham, supra note 4.
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separate maritime jurisdiction was created by the Constitution, it was
created for the purpose of dealing effectively with maritime affairs, and
should embrace such powers as are necessary adequately to do justice
in maritime disputes. Now it is impossible to do justice in such disputes,
any more than in non-maritime matters, without occasionally giving equit-
able relief. Hence, viewed as an original question, the conclusion would
seem inevitable that the admiralty should possess such powers, equit-
able or otherwise, as are reasonably needed to accomplish that aim. To
put the matter in another way, the purpose of the admiralty is not to
give any particular kind of relief but to deal with a particular kind of
subject-matter.
As a matter of principle therefore it would seem that the admiralty
should be empowered to give equitable relief. As a matter of precedent
also, there was no reason for the contrary result, once the English influ-
ence was eliminated. Continental authorities obviously afforded no sup-
port to the distinction between legal and equitable relief in admiralty,
since the European judicial system did not follow such a classification.
Whatever relief there was to be had in a dispute arising out of mari-
time subject-matter, was available in the courts of maritime jurisdiction.
Much of the confusion in this matter is due to the fact that, after all, we
have in our admiralty an intermingling of two different legal systems.
The admiralty jurisdiction is an institution borrowed from the civil-law
system, from which are derived the fundamentals of its substantive law
as well as of its procedure. But to a considerable extent common-law
elements have been added, and with respect to matters not seen to be
specifically covered by the general maritime law, it has always been the
habit of our federal judges to think and act in common-law terms. This
is natural enough since they are trained primarily in the common law,
and a large proportion of them ascend the bench with little or no knowl-
edge of maritime law. Thus it is not surprising that, being familiar
with the separate jurisdiction of courts of common law and of equity,
they should have conceived of the admiralty as a court merely of com-
mon-law powers over maritime affairs, leaving to the chancery its special
powers in both fields. It was therefore easy in this regard to fall into
line with the English precedents and to lose sight of those fundamental
purposes of the maritime jurisdiction, which usually have been vigilantly
promoted.
This limited view of the remedial powers of the admiralty was taken
in spite of a more general realization of the consequences of its civil-
law origin. Its system of pleading, for example, is different from (and
more simple than) that in use in our land courts. And in a broad way
it has always been recognized that the maritime tribunal is not a com-
mon-law court and in its functioning is not restricted by common-law
conceptions and technicalities. This may be illustrated by the following
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quotation from an opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, where, referring to a statement of the District Court, it is said:
"The statement that 'the present action is not in equity, but at law,' must
have been made inadvertently. The District Judge very well knew that the
suit was neither at law nor in equity, but in admiralty, and an admiralty court
administers maritime law by a procedure peculiar to itself and different from
that followed by either courts of common law or of equity. The admiralty
courts owe their origin largely to the civil law, and the process and methods
of procedure in such courts, as was pointed out in Richmond v. New Bedford
Copper Co., 2 Lowell, 315, Fed. Cas. No. 11,800, are even more free from
technical rules than is the case with the equity courts." 6
In accordance with this general point of view the books are full of
statements to the effect that the admiralty acts in accordance with equit-
able principles. For example:
"A court of admiralty is, as to all matters falling within its jurisdiction, a court
of equity. Its hands are not tied up by the rigid and technical rules of the
common law, but it administers justice upon the large and liberal principles
of courts which exercise a general equity jurisdiction." 6
It is only when the specific question of remedies is reached that the
courts have departed from this general conception and, resorting to the
Anglo-American distinction between law and equity, have held that the
admiralty lacks the power to give equitable relief.
The question remains of whether there are any additional considera-
tions, of either a practical or theoretical nature, which render it improper
for the admiralty to administer equitable remedies. From a practical
point of view there would seem to be no difficulty. The maritime juris-
diction is exercised by the federal District Courts sitting in admiralty.
In the absence of specific statutory restriction no reason is apparent why
a District Court hearing a case in admiralty should not act with as great
freedom as when it functions as a land court. Potentially it is as cap-
able in the one instance as in the other of issuing a decree of specific
performance or one cancelling a maritime contract. That the prevail-
ing limitation on the admiralty side is merely technical and not supported
by any practical need, is plainly indicated by the extent to which the
federal courts have gone in taking cognizance in maritime cases of
equitable matters which come up indirectly or incidentally.
64. The Kalfarli, 277 Fed. 391, 393 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921).
65. The David Pratt, Fed. Cas. No. 3,597, at 24 (D. Me. 1839). "Courts of Admiralty,
on the matters within their jurisdiction, must be governed by equitable principles .. .They
are chancery courts for the sea." Packard v. The Louisa, Fed. Cas. No. 10,652, at 962
(C. C. D. Mass. 1846). See also United States v. Cornell Steamboat Co., 202 U. S. 184
(1906); Brown v. Lull, Fed. Cas. No. 2,018 (C. C. D. Mass. 1836); Fiannacca v. Booth
& Co.. Inc., 39 F. (2d) 639 (E. D. N. Y. 1929).
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Thus it is accepted doctrine that, although affirmative equitable relief
is not available in the admiralty, that court will recognize and protect
equitable interests which are asserted defensively. A typical case is
Chirurg v. Knickerbocker Steam Towage Co.66 There a libel was filed
by the holder of the legal title to a ship to recover possession. The de-
fense was that the libelant had secured the title by fraud, and that
the respondent, who was in possession, was equitably entitled to retain
the vessel. The court under these circumstances recognized the equit-
able rights involved and refused to give the libelant relief. In other
instances also the courts have refused to give effect to a legal title or
right secured by fraud, although at times the circumstances have been
such that this has come close to constituting affirmative equitable relief.
67
In cases such as these it is obvious enough that to enforce the legal
title regardless of the equitable rights involved would be to promote
the fraud and would result in intolerable injustice. In England, how-
ever, the thing was done in another way. When the land courts deter-
mined that the High Court of Admiralty should not deal with the title,
they meant what they said, and it was necessary under circumstances
such as these for that beleaguered tribunal to delay taking any action
pending the determination by the chancery of the state of the title.
The English were at least consistent. But our courts saw no reason
why the litigants should be sent off to a state court, or compelled to
start fresh litigation on the equity side of the District Court in the event
that diversity of citizenship was present. No reason for such a course
existed, once the foundations upon which the English practice rested had
been rejected in this country. Eliminating English conceptions, it was
simple enough for the admiralty to give effect to equitable rights as-
serted defensively. It would have been equally simple, and far more
logical, to have gone the rest of the way and to have enforced equitable
rights affirmatively as well as negatively. When the foundations were
swept away, the superstructure should have gone with them. This is
particularly true in the numerous cases where equitable relief in sub-
stance could be given through the typical admiralty forms of action.!"
66. 174 Fed. 188 (D. Me. 1909).
67. The Taranto, Fed. Cas. No. 13,751 (D. Mass. 1849); Thurber v. The Fannie, Fed.
Cas. No. 14,014 (E. D. N. Y. 1876); The Hero, 6 Fed. 526 (E. D. Pa. 1881), aff'd sub
noin., Hendrickson v. Wright, 28 Fed. 242 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1886); The Daisy, 29 Fed. 300
'(D. Mass. 1886); Higgins v. Anglo-Algerian Steamship Co., 248 Fed. 386 (C. C. A. 2d,
1918). So where a contract has been entered into by mutual mistake, although the con-
tract may not be reformed in admiralty, the mistake may be set up as an equitable
defense. Meyer V. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 58 Fed. 923 (N. D. Cal. 1893); The Stanley
H. Miner, 172 Fed. 486 (E. D. N. Y. 1909). Cf. The J. B. Lunt, Fed. Cas. No. 7,246
(S. D. N. Y. 1853); The Kalfarli, supra note 64, discussed in (1922) 35 HAv. L. REv.
614.
68. See, for example, Kynoch v. The S. C. Ives, supra note 59; The Amelia, Fed. Cas.
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The lack of any real practical objection to the giving of equitable
relief in admiralty is made even more clear by the practice which has
developed with respect to accounts. While it is regularly held that a
libel will not lie for the sole purpose of an accounting, it is equally well
setted that an accounting may be had where it comes up incidentally
in a case which has other claims upon the maritime jurisdiction. As
was said in The L. B. Goldsmith:
"... the matter is not so complicated as to disable the admiralty judge from
passing upon the accounts of the parties. Sitting in admiralty, he may not
enjoy as enlightened a conscience, as when sitting in the circuit, but he pos-
sesses the same power of facilitating his labors, by directing computation,
and whether in the one or the other relation, the duty is incumbent of passing
upon the various items of the accounts of the parties, and allowing or disallow-
ing according to the rules of law, and the weight of the testimony." 09
If the admiralty is thus competent to order an accounting as inci-
dental to other relief, it is difficult to understand why it should be any
the less capable of giving the same accounting by itself. Any difficul-
ties that might exist would seem to be the same in either case. The dis-
tinction, again, was one unknown in England, where the High Court of
Admiralty was denied the power to give such relief at all, incidental or
otherwise. The American courts, in this field of remedies, have dis-
played a curious inconsistency in the way in which they have accepted
or rejected English precedents. Perhaps the key to the distinctions
actually made lies in an instinctive feeling that the rule denying equit-
able relief in admiralty lacks any substantial basis and hence in a willing-
ness to depart from it when any special consideration of convenience
is apparent. An illustration of this may be found in the matter of the
disposal of a surplus remaining in the hands of the maritime court after
a sale of a vessel for the satisfaction of maritime liens. Claims against
such a fund are often asserted by the holders of non-maritime liens or
claims against the ship. In England the High Court of Admiralty had
no power to adjudicate such claims or to distribute the proceeds to the
claimants, unless so directed by another court. In this country, how-
ever, it is held that, although unsecured creditors will be given no recog-
nition, the admiralty does have the power to determine the validity of
non-maritime liens or similar vested interests in the res and to dis-
tribute the surplus to such claimants .7  Although this power was re-
No. 275 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1877); Wenberg v. A Cargo of Mineral Phosphate, supra
note 60; The Robert R. Kirkland, supra note 59.
69. Fed. Cas. No. 8,152, at 90 (D. Mich. 1856). See also The John E. Mulford, 18
Fed. 455 (S. D. N. Y. 1883); The Emma B., 140 Fed. 771 (D. N. J. 1906); Metropolitan
Steamship Co. v. Pacific-Alaska Navigation Co., 260 Fed. 973 (D. Me. 1919).
70. Schuchardt v. Babbidge, 19 How. 239 (U. S. 1856); The Lottawanna, supra note
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garded as equitable in nature, it has been felt that to turn the fund
over to the general owner would be unjust; and, as in the other cases
where cognizance is taken of equitable matters which come up defensively
or incidentally, to require fresh litigation in the land courts would be
unnecessarily cumbersome and inconvenient.
The ease with which direot equitable relief might be given in admiralty
is further illustrated in an interesting way by the case of The Olga,71
decided in the Eastern District of New York. There the majority
owner of a vessel had agreed to sell her, and a libel was filed by the
minority owner to prevent the former from transferring title unless a
bond were given to the libelant to secure his share of the proceeds from
the sale. The court thought that the case was analogous to those which
hold that the admiralty has jurisdiction (where there is a dispute be-
tween owners regarding the employment of the vessel) to require the
majority owners to give a bond for the safe return of the vessel, and
said:
"I have been referred to no authority directly in point, but on principle it
would seem that if an admiralty court has power to issue an injunction pro-
hibiting majority owners from taking a vessel on a voyage contrary to the
wish of a minority owner, unless they give a bond for its safe return, it has
equal power to issue an injunction prohibiting owners from exercising other
acts of ownership such as transferring title, unless a bond be given that, upon
the transfer, the minority owner who objects to such transfer will receive his
share of the proceeds." 72
The court felt conscious of no objection to the issuance of an injunc-
tion, entirely losing sight of the doctrine that the admiralty is not sup-
posed to give equitable relief and forgetting that the traditional method
of exacting security for the safe return of the vessel has always been,
not by injunction, but by an action of restraint, in which the vessel her-
self is seized and held in the custody of the court until the necessary
bond is given.73
10, at 582; Harper v. New Brig, Fed. Cas. No. 6,090 (E. D. Pa. 1835); The Advance, 63
Fed. 704 (S. D. N. Y. 1894); National Bank v. Enterprise Marine Dock Co., 43 F. (2d)
547 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930); 1 CON= G, op. cit. supra note 29, at 48-72; Admiralty Rules
of Practice, Rule 42, 254 U. S. 697 (1920). Compare the admiralty practice of enter-
taining "libels of review," whereby a decree previously made will be set aside when there
has been fraud, or similar irregularity, in the earlier suit. 1 B Namcr, op. cit. supra note
5, § 275; The Frederick der Grosse, 37 F. (2d) 354 (S. D. N. Y. 1929); The Astorian,
57 F. (2d) 85 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932).
71. 254 Fed. 439 (E. D. N. Y. 1918). For comment upon this case, see Note (1919)
19 COL. L. Rxv. 239.
72. Id. at 440.
73. See the authorities cited note 28, supra; Fox v. Paine, Fed. Cas. No. 5,014 (E. D.
Pa. 1839); Bragdon v. The Kitty Simpson, Fed. Cas. No. 1,798 (S. D. N. Y. 1857);
Sturges v. The Mary Staples, Fed. Cas. No. 13,566a (S. D. N. Y. 1857); The Marengo,
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Turning now to the more theoretical aspect of the general problem,
the question may be asked whether, regardless of the lack of practical
difficulties in the giving of equitable relief, such action would result in
an infringement of any additional or extraneous principle limiting the
exercise of admiralty jurisdiction. Such an objection has been raised
in some of the cases, based upon the assumption that preliminary or
collateral transactions are involved. 4 It is, of course, the established
doctrine that jurisdiction in contract cases is dependent upon subject-
matter.7" In the application of this test, it has been regularly held
that in order to be maritime a contract must in its subject-matter directly
relate to maritime activities. Therefore, it is not sufficient that an agree-
ment has some collateral relation to water-borne commerce or to naviga-
tion, or that it is merely preliminary to or grows out of another contract
which is itself maritime.76 For example, although a contract of affreight-
ment is maritime, a contract to procure freight is not. So, an agreement
to enter into a policy of marine insurance is non-maritime, although the
policy itself is within the admiralty jurisdiction. It is on this ground, in
part at least, that a partnership agreement to engage in a maritime enter-
prise is held to be outside the jurisdiction."'
Now the question is, to what extent is this doctrine properly involved
in the cases where equitable relief is sought in admiralty. In a very
few special instances, it should be recognized, the doctrine may afford
a legitimate basis for denying such relief. There may be cases based
upon certain trust agreements which would seem to be collateral to any
Fed. Cas. No. 9,066 (D. Mass. 1859); The Susan E. Voorhis, Fed. Cas. No. 13,633 (E. D.
N. Y. 1879). Rule 19 of the Admiralty Rules of Practice, 254 U. S. 686 (1920), requires
that in suits by one or more part owners against the others to obtain security for the
return of the ship from any voyage undertaken without their consent, the process shall be
by an arrest of the ship, and by a monition to the adverse party or parties to appear
and make answer to the suit.
74. See Andrews v. Essex Fire & Marine Insurance Co., supra note 61; Wenberg v.
A Cargo of Mineral Phosphate, supra note 60; Williams v. Providence Washington Insur-
ance Co., supra note 61; The City of Clarksville, 94 Fed. 201 (D. Ind. 1899).
75. Insurance Co. v. Dunham, supra note 4; De Lovio v. Boit, supra note 5.
76. The Centurion, Fed. Cas. No. 2,554 (D. Me. 1839); The Thames, 10 Fed. 848
(S. D. N. Y. 1881); Fox v. Patton, 22 Fed. 746 (S. D. N. Y. 1884); The Crystal Stream,
25 Fed. 575 (S. D. N. Y. 1885); Marquardt v. French, 53 Fed. 603 (S. D. N. Y. 1893);
The Harvey and Henry, 86 Fed. 656 (C. C. A. 2d, 1898); Richard v. Hogarth, 94 Fed.
684 (D. N. J. 1899); St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Birrell, 164 Fed. 104 (D.
Ore. 1908); Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Chesapeake Lighterage & Towing Co., 279
Fed. 684 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922). Cf. Chase Bag Co. v. United States, 71 Ct. CIs. 264 (1930);
F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. W. E. Hedger Co, 48 F. (2d) 86 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931), cert.
den., 283 U. S. 858 (1931).
77. Vandewater v. Mills, 19 How. 82 (U. S. 1856); Ward v. Thompson, supra note 62;
The Crusader, Fed. Cas. No. 3,456 (D. Me. 1837); Turner v. Beacham, Fed. Cas. No.
14,252 (D. Md. 1858); United States v. The Isaac Hammett, Fed. Cas. No. 15,446 (W. D.
Pa. 1862); The Red Wing, 10 F. (2d) 389 (S. D. Cal. 1925).
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directly maritime matter, in the same sense as a partnership contract.
In certain of the cases also where an accounting or relief against fraud
is asked, the enforcement of some actual preliminary or collateral agree-
ment may be the thing sought. On the other hand, in the great bulk of
the cases involving equitable remedies, it seems plain that this doctrine
as to preliminary and collateral contracts cannot properly be invoked.
Certainly it has nothing to do with the issuance of injunctions or the
specific performance of contracts. Even in cases where reformation or
cancellation of contracts is sought on the ground of fraud or mistake,
the primary issue ordinarily is the validity of an agreement which is
admittedly maritime. There appears to be no justification for denying
to a tribunal which is supposed to deal with maritime contracts, the
power to determine whether such a contract should stand or what was
the true intent of the parties. It is true that this may involve an inves-
tigation into the circumstances leading up to the execution of the agree-
ment in question. But such an investigation is regarded as proper where
it is material to the interpretation of a maritime contract or to the deter-
mination of its existence in a suit for money damages for its breach;"
and it should be equally proper where it is necessary to the administra-
tion of those rights arising out of the agreement, which we call equitable.
This situation should not be confused with a case where the direct en-
forcement is sought of a contract which in itself has no immediate rela-
tion to maritime commerce or navigation, but which is connected there-
with only through the medium of a second, and maritime, agreement.
The conclusion is definite, therefore, that except in a few special cases
the general principles of admiralty jurisdiction in contract afford no
justification for the broad doctrine that equitable relief may not be had
in admiralty.
This conception that the giving of equitable relief would lead the
admiralty too far afield from the point of view of the subject-matter
of the jurisdiction, seems to have been at the root of another doctrine
which has been gaining a foothold of recent years. This is the doctrine
that even quasi contractual relief may not be given in admiralty. It
may be illustrated by the case of Israel v. Moore & McCormack Co. 9
There the libelant had shipped coffee on the respondent's ship. During
the voyage the ship jettisoned a part of the cargo without the knowledge
of the libelant, who on arrival paid the whole freight due under the bills
of lading, supposing the coffee was still on board. The libel sought the
recovery of the freight paid upon the part jettisoned. Upon ordinary
principles of quasi contract it is clear that a recovery would be allowed
in order to prevent unjust enrichment. The District Court, however,
78. See Armour & Co. v. Fort Morgan Steamsbip Co., 270 U. S. 253 (1926).
79. 295 Fed. 919 (S. D. N. Y. 1920).
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dismissed the libel for lack of jurisdiction. Judge Learned Hand, who
heard the case, stated that he could see on principle no clear reason
either way, but that the question was controlled by the decision of the
Circuit Court of Appeals in United Transportation & Lighterage Co. v.
New York & Baltimore Transportation Line."0 This case, decided in
1911, apparently constitutes the starting point of the doctrine that the
admiralty may not give relief in quasi contract. The facts were some-
what more complicated than in Israel v. Moore & McCormack Co., and
the court felt some question as to whether under ordinary principles
relief could be had at law on quasi contractual grounds, or whether it
would be necessary to resort to equity. It held, however, that in either
event the court of admiralty had no jurisdiction. So far as equitable
relief was involved, it had to be denied under the regular rule that equit-
able remedies may not be administered in admiralty. And even assuming
that the case was of the sort where an action of assumpsit for money
had and received would lie at law, a court of admiralty could not give
such relief, "because the implied promise to repay the moneys which
cannot in good conscience be retained-necessary to support the action
for rhoney had and received-is not a maritime contract."
The court's reasoning is that a quasi contractual recovery is based upon
an implied promise and that such promise is not a maritime contract,
under the general rule that admiralty has no jurisdiction over agreements
leading up to the execution of maritime contracts nor over non-maritime
transactions growing out of the execution of maritime contracts. This
conclusion is open to grave objection. So far as the general rule relating
to preliminary and collateral matters is concerned, it is regularly accepted
and there is no need to question its soundness.81 The true issue is how far
it should go. This should depend upon its underlying purpose. There
is of course no clear line of demarcation between agreements whose
subject-matter is maritime and those of a non-maritime character. The
transition is gradual, and the existence of many close cases is inevit-
able. The guiding conception must be that the admiralty should not
stray too far from its primary function of dealing with the transactions
that arise out of navigation and maritime commerce. And where there
are two distinct contracts, one admittedly maritime and the other mari-
time only to the extent that it is preliminary to or grows out of the
first, it is reasonable enough that the line should be drawn between the
80. 185 Fed. 386 (C. C. A. 2d, 1911). Since the decision of this case, quasi contractual
relief has also been denied in Boem Brothers v. United States, 1924 A. M. C. 1474 (E. D.
N. Y. 1924), and Home Insurance Co. v. Merchants' Transportation Co., 16 F. (2d)
372 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926). Cf. The Danebrog, 1923 A. M. C. 405 (S. D. N. Y. 1923);
The Pacific Cedar, 61 F. (2d) 187 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932), cert. granted, 289 U. S. 716 (1933).
81. But see Learned Hand, J., in The Barryton, 94 F. (2d) 282, 284 (C. C. A. 2d,
1931).
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two. But can the case of quasi contractual recovery be assimilated with
this situation? In the United Transportation case the Circuit Court of
Appeals made the two look alike by adopting the common statement
that a recovery in quasi contract is based upon an implied promise and
then by regarding this promise as a separate and collateral contract.
The reasoning is deceptive because the statement is false in fact. The
talk of "implied promise" in quasi contract cases is purely a legal fiction.
The truth of course is that there is no actual promise and no second
contract. But a legal obligation to pay is imposed because this is nec-
essary to prevent unjust enrichment from accruing as the result of mis-
take in the performance of the initial contract. From the point of view
of admiralty jurisdiction, the true issue is whether the giving of this
sort of relief is a proper function of the maritime tribunals.
It is hard for the writer to understand why there should be any
difficulty about this question today. As has been stated repeatedly in
this study, the cardinal conception which has guided the Supreme Court
in the formulation of the law of admiralty jurisdiction in this country
has been that that jurisdiction should be established upon a broad and
comprehensive basis, such as will enable the maritime courts to deal
adequately with maritime affairs. And certainly adequate power to
deal with maritime affairs must include the power in some way to pre-
vent unjust enrichment within that field. It is no answer that such
relief is not based strictly upon the contract. The issue is whether the
court is reaching beyond the sphere of maritime affairs and dealing with
matters primarily related to the land and land commerce. The estab-
lished, though arbitrary, limitation as to equitable relief is not involved
here, since quasi contractual recovery under the Anglo-American system
may be had at law. Nor can there be any general limitation requiring
the admiralty to enforce only rights which are strictly in contract, or
in tort. Any such possibility is foreclosed by the law of salvage and of
general average. There is no function of the admiralty which is more
peculiarly and characteristically maritime than the administration of
these subjects. Rights of this character are not dependent on contract.
One who saves property at sea acquires the right to an award of salvage,
regardless of any agreement between him and the owner. Similarly,
where cargo is jettisoned, the owner thereof becomes entitled to a con-
tribution in general average from the owners of other cargo which has
been saved, without the aid of a contract. In a broad way these rights
may well be described as quasi contractual.82 From a jurisdictional point
82. See WooDwARD, QuAsi CONTRACTS (1913) § 206, where the author says, referring
to salvage, "Obviously, the essentials of quasi contractual liability, as set forth in the
preceding sections (ante, §§ 191, 192, 197) are all present." See also MAYERS, op. Cit.
supra note 21, at 8; De Lovio v. Boit, supra note 5, at 444. Compare also the right in
admiralty of one joint tortfeasor to recover contribution from another. 1 Bmm=r,
op. cit. supra note 5, § 353; HuGHs, op. cit. supra note 53, § 151.
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of view they seem indistinguishable from the ordinary quasi contractual
right created to prevent unjust enrichment. In the latter case it should
be sufficient that the contract out of the performance of which the unjust
enrichment arises, is maritime.
Why the contrary doctrine should have come into existence as late
as the present century is puzzling. The only rational basis for it would
seem to lie in a desire to hold the maritime jurisdiction of the federal
courts to the narrowest possible limits. Such a desire had wide vogue
in the early days of the republic, and was responsible for the bitter con-
troversy over the acceptance or rejection of the narrow English limits
upon the admiralty jurisdiction. This was of course an incident to the
greater controversy between the exponents of states' rights and those
who believed in a powerful federal government. The resulting uncer-
tainty in the early days as to the basic approach undoubtedly had much
to do with the inception of the rule that equitable relief could not be
given in admiralty. This old controversy, however, has been dead and
buried too long to have been an active cause of the new doctrine as to
quasi contractual relief, developed only within the last twenty-five years.
The only explanation of this latest restriction upon the admiralty lies in
the failure of the courts to penetrate to the true issues. Probably the
rule as to equitable relief has been too long established to be overthrown
by court decision. The doctrine that the admiralty cannot give a re-
covery in quasi contract, however, not only is of late origin but seems
in conflict with certain earlier decisions upon the same question. 3 It
has not, as yet, received the approval of the Supreme Court, and should
be eradicated before it goes further.
IV
A precise understanding of the reasons why equitable and quasi con-
tractual relief have not been given in admiralty would appear to be vital
in the determination of another and important question-that of how
far these rules established by court decision may be changed by statute.
As was pointed out early in this article, Congress possesses an implied
legislative power over the maritime law. This power is limited, however,
by its source, which is found in the constitutional grant to the federal
government of judicial power over "all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction." The interpretation of this phrase is a judicial function,
and any act of Congress will be held unconstitutional which, in the
opinion of the courts, attempts to extend the functions of the admiralty
beyond the proper limits of the constitutional grant.8 4 The question of
83. For a discussion of these cases see Chandler, Quasi Contractual Relief in Admiralty
(1928) 27 MicH. L. REv. 23. See also St. Lawrence Sugar Refineries, Ltd. v. United States,
31 F. (2d) 804 (S. D. N. Y. 1924).
84. Note 19, supra.
[Vol. 43
REMEDIAL POWERS OF ADMIRALTY
whether the established doctrine as to relief can be changed by Congress
thus depends upon the extent to which it is based upon limitations of
jurisdiction in the constitutional sense. If a suit in which equitable or
quasi contractual relief is sought is not a "case of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction" within the meaning of the Constitution, it cannot be made
so by statute. If, however, the rules laid down in the cases are to be
regarded as limitations of substantive law, Congress may alter them at
will.
So far as the cases themselves are concerned, it has been the regular
practice of the courts to speak of the limitations laid down in terms of
jurisdiction. But in the light of the broad interpretation generally given
to the constitutional grant, it is impossible to believe that the Constitu-
tion wholly forbids the giving of equitable or quasi contractual relief in
admiralty. And any such point of view has been emphatically rejected
by the Supreme Court in the three instances in which it has had occasion
to consider the constitutionality of legislation extending in this regard
the powers of the maritime courts.
The first instance of this type of legislation is to be found in the Lim-
ited Liability Acts." The general effect of these statutes is to enable
a shipowner under specified circumstances to limit his liability for any
loss, damage, etc., arising out of the operation of his vessel, to the value
of such vessel and freight pending. The statutes do not specify how
this limitation shall be made effective, but merely provide that the ship-
owners "may take the appropriate proceedings in any court, for the pur-
pose of apportioning the sum for which the owner of the vessel may be
liable among the parties entitled thereto." 6  The obviously appropriate
manner of accomplishing this purpose is to bring into a single admiralty
proceeding all claims coming within the scope of the legislation, which
can be done through the issuance of an order restraining the prosecution
of other suits. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has interpreted the stat-
ute as authorizing the issuance in admiralty of injunctions for this pur-
pose.87  Construing the Act in this way, the Court felt no doubt as to
its constitutionality, although it has recognized that the proceedings are
fundamentally equitable in nature. In Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., after referring to earlier decisions, the Court
said:
"It is quite evident from these cases that this Court has by its rules and deci-
sions given the statute a very broad and equitable construction for the purpose
85. Act of March 3, 1851, 9 STAT. 635 (1851); Act of June 26, 1884, § 18, 23 STAT. 57
(1884); Act of June 19, 1886, § 4, 24 STAT. 80 (1886), all 46 U. S. C. §§ 183-189 (1926).
86. Act of March 3, 1851, § 4, 9 STAT. 636 (1851), 46 U. S. C. § 184 (1926).
87. Admiralty Rules of Practice, Rule 51, 254 U. S. 703 (1920); Norwich Co. v.
Wright, 13 Wall. 104 (U. S. 1871); Providence & New 'York Steamship Co. v. Hill Manu-
facturing Co., 109 U. S. 578 (1883); 1 BENEnxcr, op. cit. supra note 5, § 510.
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of carrying out its purpose and for facilitating a settlement of the whole con-
troversy over such losses as are comprehended within it, and that all the ease
with which rights can be adjusted in equity is intended to be given to the
proceeding. It is the administration of equity in an admiralty court. Dowdell
v. United States District Court, 139 Fed. 444, 445. The proceeding partakes
in a way of the features of a bill to enjoin a multiplicity of suits, a bill in the
nature of an interpleader, and a creditor's bill. It looks to a complete and
just disposition of a many cornered controversy ..." 88
The issuance of injunctions in admiralty was again authorized by
Congress in the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act of 1927.89 Section 21(b) of this Act provides that, if not in accord-
ance with law, a compensation order may be suspended or set aside
through injunction proceedings brought against the deputy commissioner
making the order. In Crowell v. Benson,9° the Supreme Court declared
that this provision for injunction proceedings was not open to objection,
saying that Congress was at liberty to draw upon another system of
procedure to equip the court with suitable and adequate means for en-
forcing the standards of the maritime law as defined by the Act. It
was also said that, by statute and rules, courts of admiralty may be
empowered to grant injunctions, as in the case of limitation of liability
proceedings.
Finally, Congress has authorized the giving of equitable relief in ad-
miralty in the United States Arbitration Act of 1925.Y1 This statute
provides (in Section 4) that a party aggrieved by the alleged failure,
neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for
arbitration may petition a court of the United States for an order direct-
ing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such
agreement. In the case of contracts otherwise within the maritime juris-
diction, such proceedings are to be brought in admiralty. In the recent
case of Marine Transit Corporation v. Dreyfus, 2 the constitutionality
of this provision was attacked. It was argued by counsel that the effect
of the Act was to confer upon the admiralty courts the equitable power
to enforce specific performance of contracts, and that such power, under
the well-established law as to its jurisdiction, is not vested in a court of
admiralty. It was further argued that Congress cannot enlarge the
jurisdiction of courts of admiralty, since the determination of what
88. 273 U. S. 207, 215-216 (1927). For further illustrations of the equitable nature
of limitation proceedings, see Oregon Rr. & Navigation Co. v. Balfour, 90 Fed. 295 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1898), cert. den., 176 U. S. 685 (1900), and appeal dismissed, 179 U. S. 55 (1900);
The Salvore, 36 F. (2d) 712 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
89. 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U. S. C. Supp. VI §§ 901-950 (1932).
90. Supra note 19, at 49.
91. 43 STAT. 883 (1925), 9 U. S. C. §§ 1-15 (1926).
92. 284 U. S. 263 (1932).
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matters fall within their jurisdiction is a purely judicial question. The
Court, however, upheld the constitutionality of the statute, and disposed
of the above arguments in the following language:
"The general power of the Congress to provide remedies in matters falling
within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts, and to regulate their
procedure, is indisputable. The petitioner contends that the Congress could
not confer upon courts of admiralty the authority to grant specific performance.
But it is well settled that the Congress, in providing appropriate means to
enforce obligations cognizable in admiralty, may draw upon other systems.
Thus the Congress may afithorize a trial by jury in admiralty, as it has done
in relation to certain cases arising on the Great Lakes.93 Courts of admiralty
may be empowered to grant injunctions, as in proceedings for limitation of
liability.94  Similarly, there can be no question of the power of Congress to
authorize specific performance when that is an appropriate remedy in a mat-
ter within the admiralty jurisdiction." 0
These decisions make it perfectly plain that there is no constitutional
objection to the issuance of injunctions or of decrees of specific per-
formance in admiralty. The further question may be asked whether
the situation is any different with respect to other forms of equitable
relief. Certainly the attitude of the Supreme Court makes it apparent
that so long as no more is involved than the matter of remedies, Con-
gress may alter or enlarge the powers of the admiralty as it sees fit.
The problem then becomes one of determining how far the giving of
equitable relief reaches beyond the sphere of remedies and comes into
conflict with other jurisdictional limitations. The only possible argu-
ment in this direction would seem to be based upon the conception pre-
viously discussed, that when a court of admiralty gives equitable relief
it is taking jurisdiction not only over the primary maritime subject-
matter before it, but over preliminary or collateral (and hence non-
maritime) matters as well. If in fact such matters are involved, so that
non-maritime agreements or transactions are being adjudicated, the con-
clusion may reasonably be drawn that the admiralty would be exercising
jurisdiction in excess of that granted by the Constitution. For undoubt-
edly the general principle that preliminary and similar agreements are
non-maritime embodies a limitation of jurisdiction in the constitutional
sense. And it is this sort of limitation which cannot be altered by Con-
gress. But if the analysis hereinbefore made is sound, the jurisdictional
limitation in question can properly be invoked only in a few exceptional
93. Act of February 26, 1845, c. 20, 5 Stat. 726; R. S. 566, U. S. C., Tit. 28, § 770;
The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443, 459, 460; The Eagle, 8 Wall. 15, 25. [Footnote by the
Court.]
94. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 273 U. S. 207, 218.
[Footnote by the Court.]
95. Supra note 92, at 278.
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situations where a true preliminary agreement, or something analogous
thereto, is actually involved. In the ordinary run of cases, where equit-
able or quasi contractual relief is sought, such relief can be given without
the adjudication of any issues which are fundamentally non-maritime.
All that is involved is the application of remedies which are needed in
order to do justice in the adjudication of disputes arising out of mari-
time transactions. In other words, the general limitations as to equit-
able and quasi contractual relief established by the case law are not
to be regarded as limitations of jurisdiction imposed by the Constitu-
tion, but merely as restrictions existing in the substantive maritime
law. As such, Congress may remove them to such extent as it sees fit.
If this conclusion is correct that the Constitution does not prevent
the giving of equitable and quasi contractual relief in admiralty, there'
arises afresh the question of why such remedies should not be admin-
istered without the aid of specific statutory authority. It is true of
course that the constitutional grant of judicial power over "all cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" is not self-executing. But the
provision first contained in the Judiciary Act of 1789 by which the fed-
eral District Courts are given "exclusive original cognizance of all civil
causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" Il has always been in
effect. Except as limited by the word "civil," the jurisdiction thus
bestowed upon the District Courts has been regarded as coextensive
with the constitutional grant; and certainly a case in which equitable
or quasi contractual relief is sought comes within the category of "civil
causes." It follows that the usual failure of the admiralty to give such
relief cannot be attributed to any defect of jurisdiction, either consti-
tutional or statutory. The results reached can be based only upon
the theory that they are required by limitations of substantive law.
As an original proposition it is impossible to discover any good rea-
son for such limitations in the substantive law. Within the scope of its
constitutional authority, the admiralty should be deemed to possess such
powers as are needed in order to do adequate justice in the settlement
of maritime disputes. This was the view adopted when there were in
controversy the issues of whether petitory suits, and suits between part-
owners of a vessel for sale and partition, 7 could be maintained in
admiralty. The major objection to the exercise of such power was based
upon the argument that English precedents should be followed. Once
the latter were rejected, no reason was apparent why the admiralty
should not be endowed with liberal remedial powers. If the same point
of view had been adhered to, these powers would also have included
96. Note 1, supra.
97. It has been recognized that the restricted circumstances under which the admiralty
will decree the sale of a vessel at the suit of a part owner are due to to limitations of
substantive law and not to limitations of jurisdiction. Fischer v. Carey, 173 Cal. 185, 159
Pac. 577 (1916).
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the administration of equitable remedies. But here the course of de-
velopment was different, and in the early cases there is considerable
evidence to indicate that in denying equitable relief the courts of admi-
ralty were swayed by the English rules. Why in this situation they
should have bowed to that authority which was so emphatically rejected
in the other very similar cases mentioned, is probably explained by two
considerations. In the first place, the mental habits of judges trained
in the Anglo-American legal system made it easy for them to think in
terms of common-law and equity jurisdiction and to assimilate the admi-
ralty jurisdiction with that of a court of common law. In the second
place, the matter does not seem to have aroused as much controversy
as did other similar questions regarding the jurisdiction and powers of
the admiralty, and the true issues were never understood with the same
clearness.
The lack of critical attention which has been paid to this subject of
equitable remedies, together with the more recent denial of the admi-
ralty's power to give quasi contractual relief, may perhaps suggest that
after all the choice of forum is not a matter of great practical impor-
tance in these cases. But it is difficult to see why, for example, in
litigation involving a maritime contract, the forum is not as important
where specific performance or cancellation or reformation is sought, as
where the libelant in an action in personam merely seeks money damages
for its breach. The only difference would seem to be that the occasion
for equitable relief arises more rarely. No doubt the need for a separate
federal admiralty jurisdiction is not as great today as it was in 1789,
but in interpreting the law it must be assumed that the reasons for it
still exist. It was created not merely to provide for the adoption of the
characteristic principles of the general maritime law, which could have
been (and were) applied in state tribunals, but also to escape from
local diversities and jealousies and to secure to maritime commerce the
uniformity of legal administration which could be had only in the
federal courts. What determines the need for these thihgs is not the
type of relief given, which from the jurisdictional point of view is
merely incidental, but the maritime nature of the transactions with respect
to which the relief is sought. If the separate admiralty jurisdiction has
any value, it is absurd to force the litigant elsewhere merely because,
upon the same subject-matter, justice demands some remedy other than
money damages in tort or for breach of contract.98
98. In the foregoing discussion of the American law, no consideration has been given
to one important remedy-namely, the foreclosure in admiralty of mortgages on ships.
While the matter of equitable relief is involved to some extent in such a proceeding, the
power of the maritime courts over mortgages hinges also upon further problems of juris-
diction. These problems are so extensive that a discussion of them would unduly enlarge
the bounds of the present study. Hence the subject will be left for consideration on another
occasion.
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